Introduction
on Denkkollektiv (thought collectives) (see Fleck 1935 Fleck , 1979 ; see also Cohen and Schnelle 1986) . And more recently, scholars in science studies focusing on a variety of so cio log i cal, historical, and philosophical proj ects have developed several other concepts to address such concerns. Alistair Crombie introduced the concept of styles of thought to distinguish among six modes of "scientifi c inquiry, argument and explanation," all within what he regarded as a "specifi c style of rationality created within Eu ro pean culture. " 1 Ian Hacking embraces this anthropological proj ect but speaks instead of styles of reasoning, or of styles of scientifi c thinking and doing. His concern is to emphasize the dimension of doing so crucial to ways of fi nding out but missing from Crombie's concept. Th e shift in language is also impor tant to Hacking's philosophical proj ect of tracking diff er ent ways of introducing new objects, new sentences about these objects, and new criteria both for determining what sentences are subject to the judgment of true or false and for adjudicating their truth or falsity (see Hacking 1982 Hacking , 1992 Hacking , 2012 . Both Crombie's and Hacking's concepts seek to describe ways of doing science as longue durée phenomena. Other concepts have emerged in the context of proj ects aimed at grasping similar but shorter-term phenomena. With the introduction of "epistemic cultures," sociologist Karin Knorr Cetina seeks to understand knowledge socie ties in terms that are not only economic (seeing knowledge as a productive force) but also cultural. In this regard, epistemic cultures (alternatively, cultures of knowledge settings or diff er ent machineries of knowing) are for her constitutive units of knowledge socie ties. Her approach to epistemic cultures is mainly through ethnographic studies (carried out, e.g., in laboratories) to identify the entities an epistemic culture brings into play and the relations between these entities such a culture establishes (Knorr Cetina 2005, 65, 67-68 ; see also Knorr Cetina 1999) . By contrast, Evelyn Fox Keller reviews the history of twentieth-century approaches to the prob lem of embryonic development, focusing on the failure of communication among diff er ent collectives working on the same phenomena. She introduces the notion of epistemological culture to account for the reluctance, voiced by one group, to accept the types of explanation, or even the questions, put forward by another as meaningful (see Keller 2002) . For her, epistemological factors (e.g., types of explanations sought, or modes of reasoning employed) appear as features of a scientifi c culture that are essential to take into account in characterizing collectively shared ways of doing science and in explaining failures of communication between groups.
Although the set of concepts mentioned above is far from exhaustive, it suffi ces to illustrate the variety of approaches that historians, phi los o phers, sociologists, and anthropologists of science have been advocating, all in the eff ort to further identify the characteristics that lend par tic u lar ways of making scientifi c knowledge their specifi city and that distinguish among the diverse cultures of scientifi c practice.
How do these concepts relate to one another? To what extent are they redundant? To what extent incompatible? In what ways might they inform and enrich more concrete, empirically based, historical and philosophical studies? Th ese are obvious theoretical questions to be addressed in attempting to sharpen the methodological tools needed to account for diversity in scientifi c practice. Th is book is partly devoted to such an inquiry. However, during this eff ort we have encountered other questions that also need to be addressed.
Part I: Some Prob lems Attached to Concepts of Culture, and the Th eses of the Book Several concepts put forward in the eff ort to attend to the diversity in ways of doing science invoke the notion of culture-a notion that brings with it prob lems long debated in the humanities, although less so in science studies. We suggest that the time has come to fi ll this gap.
An overriding prob lem that has been much emphasized, especially in the anthropological lit er a ture, derives from the enormously diffi cult task of defi ning what one means by "culture" (see Geertz 2000, 11-13; Knorr Cetina 2005, 71) . One of the tasks this book addresses is clarifying what appears impor tant to the meaning of this term in the par tic u lar context of scientifi c practice.
Closely associated with this prob lem of defi nition are two risks that the recent interest in local cultures of scientifi c practice brings with it-risks to which the notion of culture is itself prone and to which our own intellectual histories surely make us especially sensitive: the temptation posed by concepts of culture to slight the dynamic and interactive character of the formation of any kind of cultural identity, and the pitfall of cultural essentialism (what we call culturalism), the view of cultures as essentially homogeneous, static, and fi xed by prior constraints or race, gender, or nationality. 2 In this introduction, we fi rst query the necessity of a notion of culture for our proj ect and then go on to examine these two risks in greater detail. Th is enables us to then pres ent our own approach to the disunities of scientifi c practice, which we claim can avoid such risks.
In chapter 1, Donald MacKenzie begins with a refl ection on the general diffi culties of the concept of culture in the social sciences, and in science studies in par tic u lar. Would it be better, he asks, to restrict ourselves to such notions as clusters of practices? In relation to his own case study of securities and ratings in the last fi nancial crisis, and more specifi cally of the practice of evaluation, he decides not, for doing so would deprive us of a crucial explanatory resource; it would also lose some key features of the situations under study.
More specifi cally, in MacKenzie's own case study, the concept of culture brings into focus certain key features that prove of general validity. First, it draws attention to the diff er ent ontologies associated with diff er ent practices (in this case, diff er ent assumptions about "what economic value consists of and [about] the nature of the economic pro cesses that create it"). Second, culture captures the diff er ent pro cesses of socialization associated with these ontologies, as well as the mechanisms for interaction among participants. Fi nally, the notion of culture focuses attention on how patterns of change in current practice depend on local histories of past practice. Indeed, these suggestions, along with others to which we return later, signal features of scientifi c cultures that recur throughout this book.
MacKenzie concludes that, in this case at least, culture remains a useful and even indispensable analytical concept, despite the prob lems it raises. 3 Accepting this conclusion, however, still leaves us with the task of addressing concerns about the risks associated with the notion of culture. But fi rst, do these risks actually manifest in the history and philosophy of science? Th is question is addressed from a variety of perspectives in the remaining chapters of part I. Kenji Ito's contribution in chapter 2 of this volume, focusing on histories of science in Japan, bears witness to the fact that such prob lems are quite real. He identifi es (and deplores) essentialist tendencies in a number of prominent publications on the history of physics in Japan. Th ese historical writings, he notes, give diff erences between physics in Japan and elsewhere pride of place and oft en account for them in culturalist terms (i.e., by reference to the actors' Japa neseness). Ito's primary concern with the latter view is its tacit view of scientifi c activities in Asia as exotic and as shaped by stereotypic national identities of "the East. " In other words, his focus is on the par tic u lar form of essentialism described by Edward Said as orientalism (see Said 1978) . Note, however, that in this case orientalism is as much a tacit assumption as it is a product of the history of science. Diff erences in scientifi c practices are interpreted as manifesting a Japa nese culture and identity, while the interpretation in turn helps shape or reinforce the ste reo type on which it is based. Th is orientalizing stance, Ito stresses, is not just common in historical discussions of science in Japan but is even encouraged by the expectations of the profession. Of par tic u lar importance here is his analy sis of the forces at play in contemporary history of science that contribute to the promotion of essentialist historiography. 4 Ito's main criticisms of such orientalist tendencies in the history of science are fourfold. First, they misrepresent the de facto diversity of science in Japan. Second, they overlook the transnational dimensions of current practices.
5 Th ird, in their preoccupation with diff erence, these historiographies obscure the extent to which the appearance of sameness (or uniformity) between twentieth-century physics in Japan and elsewhere is in fact a puzzle and not a natu ral or spontaneous outcome of the universality of science. Sameness in scientifi c practice or knowledge actually appears as an achievement deriving from actors' intentional eff ort to overcome diff erences. Indeed, the issue of shaping sameness, and the work through which actors achieve it, recurs throughout this book and is clearly a phenomenon in critical need of historical analy sis.
Fi nally, Ito criticizes the empirical support provided by these historiographies. Th is point requires clarifi cation. Indeed, if one can expose prob lems in the empirical basis that should support observers' essentialist conclusions with re spect to scientifi c practice and knowledge in Japan, the tricky issue is that such essentialist tendencies at the same time echo many accounts by Japa nese actors themselves. How are we to deal with this issue? Ito dubs this phenomenon self-orientalism and challenges us to deal with it, at the very least reminding us to exercise caution in distinguishing between actors' and observers' categories. Th e introduction of culture as an actors' category and actors' use of it are phenomena that observers must examine in a critical way and not absorb automatically into their analytic toolbox. Whether or not actors' conceptions and uses of culture are those relevant and useful for an observer's proj ect must be treated as an open question.
Chapter 3 provides a good example of the need for such an approach. Guillaume Lachenal analyzes the circumstances and contexts in which actors might fi nd it useful to claim authority for resources they perceive as indigenous. His case study illustrates the use of cultural essentialist categories by scientifi c actors in contexts extending far beyond scientifi c communities. His par tic u lar focus is on the controversy following the announcement in 2001 of the discovery of a vaccine against aids by a well-known Cameroon professor of medicine and former minister of health. Of relevance to us here is the fact that the vaccine was defi ned by local actors as Cameroonian and hence as opposed to the culture of transnational biomedical research. Lachenal also relates the case to other episodes in which actors claim an inherent "Africanity" for their cures in the expectation that such claims might enhance their value.
Th e risks attached to strategies of enhancing value of scientifi c research through appeals to native culture are manifest and would only be exacerbated were they to be embraced by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and phi los o phers of science. In turn, the use of culturalist categories by observers can also provide support for their deployment by actors themselves, escalating the risks yet further. As Robert Kowalenko (2011) warns us, the story of aids in South Africa might well illustrate how disastrous the consequences can be. 6 Like Ito, Lachenal insists that observers need to take actors' culturalist statements as objects of research and not embrace them uncritically, and he clearly illustrates the value of such research with his own analy sis of how the combination of the organ ization of worldwide biomedical research and local politics infl uenced the development of these episodes of self-orientalism. Noteworthy for our argument is the fact that, in Ito's case, actors' culturalism relates to the resources available for the practice of science-the Japa nese would have access to specifi c resources helpful in the advancement of a theorywhile in Lachenal's case study, Africanity is also claimed for the results of the inquiry, that is, for the knowledge produced. Th e distinction between these two levels will prove of interest in what follows. 7 
Worries with a History
Prob lems associated with cultural essentialism with re spect to science have worried historians of science at least since World War II. Sinologist Joseph Needham, for example, repeatedly voiced concern that perceiving science in such ways ran the risk of denying what he called the "continuity" of both mankind and science (Chemla 2014) . Relatedly, he also described the dangers he attached to the conception that mankind could be decomposed into distinct cultures, separate from one another, each developing its own science, valid only for the originating culture, specifi c to it, and incommensurate with the other sciences (see Chemla 2014 for references to specifi c quotations). By contrast, the historiographies of science and culture that Needham and historian Lucien Febvre developed from 1947 onward, in the context of the newly established unesco, all emphasized that mankind could not be meaningfully cut into pieces (see Petitjean and Domingues 2007) . Interestingly, when in the 1970s Needham became explicit about risks specifi c to the history of science, he had in mind not only cultures of the type discussed by Ito and Lachenal in this book, which actors of that time were loudly reclaiming as specifi c, but also the ways of pinpointing diversity in collectively shared ways of doing science, which observers, like Kuhn with his notion of paradigms, were already beginning to advocate.
Needham's strategy in reaction to the dilemma resembles that advocated by Ito: he focused on "sameness. " He did so in a specifi c way. He systematically read similarity between scientifi c results found in two distinct parts of the planet as proof of a circulation of knowledge from one to the other, and hence as proof that knowledge could be shared worldwide. However, this strategy has been criticized for methodological fl aws, and rightly so. Statements of similarity overshadowed signifi cant diff erences, and the hypothesis of in de pen dent occurrence was almost systematically ruled out. Moreover, Needham's strategy actively denies the manifest diversity in cultures of scientifi c practice that we want to address. Is there no way of accounting for such diversity without running into the prob lems associated with cultural essentialism that both Ito's and Lachenal's chapters demonstrate?
Th e question is not confi ned to science studies. Evelyn Fox Keller in chapter 4 examines what historians and phi los o phers of science might learn from de cades of debate in feminist theory about similar issues. Recognition of the force of gender categories in organ izing our conceptual and social landscapes marked a critical milestone in the emergence of feminist theory, but discussion quickly became enmired in worries about the lure of cultural essentialism. Th e question for feminist scholars-how can one recognize the force of gender categories while avoiding the pitfalls of gender essentialism?-bears an obvious parallel to the one we are concerned with here. At the same time, the history of debates in feminist studies also reveals another pitfall: an anxiety over essentialism so great as to threaten the very eff ort to understand the signifi cance of cultural diff erences. Exactly the same questions arise here. How do we avoid throwing out the baby with the bath water? How can one write about scientifi c cultures (or gender) as both recognizable and consequential, without inviting the assumption that such cultures (or categories) are fi xed and closed to external infl uence?
To summarize the points made so far, we can readily recognize the importance of highlighting diff erences between cultures of scientifi c practice in the history and philosophy of science, both in eff orts to combat tacit assumptions of uniformity/spontaneous universality (and hence the hegemony implied by such assumptions) and in the eff ort to do justice to the actual life of the sciences. But doing so is fraught with dangers. Up to now we have focused on the dangers of culturalism, both in science studies and in feminist theory. Th ese risks relate to the shaping of collectives as separate using either the way they practice science (against the assumption of uniformity) or the kind of knowledge they produce (against the assumption of universality of science). But in this latter re spect, Keller emphasizes, highlighting such differences also creates other prob lems, eliciting other dangers. In par tic u lar, it raises the old but still critical prob lem of relativism-the other prob lem Needham attempted to avoid by insisting on the universality of science.
Can the conclusions of diff er ent scientifi c cultures be evaluated in relation to each other? Or does the recognition of diff erences among them imply that they can be judged only from within? Must we assume (as was once common) that these conclusions have equal relevance to the world (or worlds) to which they ostensibly refer? Th ese questions are consubstantial with the very proj ect of considering diff erences among cultures. Here again, it proves vital for the analy sis to distinguish between actors' claims, with re spect to the specifi city of their knowledge, and observers' assessments. Actors' claims are impor tant objects of research, much in the way Lachenal advocates in his chapter. Keller reminds us, as observers, of pitfalls of ignoring how much of the natu ral world we inhabit is in fact shared. She also insists on the questions compelled by the recognition of diversity among cultures of scientifi c practice about how these diff er ent cultures connect to one another and how a wider and more critical consensus can be-and oft en is-reached. She argues that, especially in the light of the global prob lems that now loom, these questions too are part of the challenge we must face.
Our Approach to Cultures of Scientifi c Practice
We can now lay out the agenda of this book more clearly. For us, a key outcome of part I is that it sheds light on critical aspects in notions of culture that are at least sometimes invoked by actors themselves. In these conceptions, cultures are all-encompassing. Th ey are general contexts in which scientifi c activity takes place. Th ey leave their imprint on the practices and bodies of knowledge achieved, granting them their value in the eyes of the collective sharing the culture in question. Furthermore, these cultures are taken to be impervious to change. Most impor tant, the scientifi c activity of the actors has no impact on their culture-that remains unaff ected by external infl uences. Th ese features of a notion of culture, we claim, are precisely those that allow the emergence of culturalist agenda and give rise to the risks identifi ed. But do they accord with what we observe in scientifi c practice? We don't believe so.
If, following MacKenzie's analy sis, we acknowledge the need for science studies to put into play some concept of culture, this book aims at developing another approach. Its core idea is introduced in MacKenzie's chapter and explored from vari ous viewpoints in the remaining parts of the book. Above all, MacKenzie (along with many of the other contributors) insists that a culture of scientifi c practice is a product of what actors do-it is an outcome rather than a cause of their activity. In other words, the book places emphasis on the fact that actors shape the immediate context in which they carry out their scientifi c activity. Th e term "context" can refer to many diff erent notions, but it is especially its use in relation to the specifi cs of scientifi c practice on which this book concentrates.
Furthermore, as the outcome of activity, a culture of scientifi c practice is subject to constant change-in relation to the prob lems actors address and the goals they pursue and in the ways they draw on the resources available to them to mold and remold their objects of research, their values, and so forth. Fi nally, we suggest that establishing bridges between cultures of scientifi c practice is also part of what actors do. Overcoming diff erences in knowledge and practice, constructing sameness (or even universality), and achieving consensus are not properties of scientifi c practice and knowledge that are given a priori but are outcomes of actors' knowledge activities. However, this part of scientifi c work-whether considered synchronically or diachronically-has as yet not been systematically examined as a general phenomenon in the history and philosophy of science (we return to this issue later). 8 We will proceed in three main steps. Part II of the book examines specifi c components of these cultures, whereas part III takes a more global view. Finally, part IV addresses the historiographic implications of our suggestions for investigating cultures of scientifi c practice while avoiding the pitfalls of culturalism.
Part II: A Toolbox for Investigating Cultures of Scientifi c Practice
Th e essays in part II engage the issues of cultural diversity by adopting an analytic approach, discussing constituent ele ments and features of cultures that appear essential to characterize a given way of carry ing out scientifi c activities.
Th e thesis of culture as something that actors do comes out forcefully from Nancy J. Nersessian's case studies in chapter 5, where she examines the constitution of new cultures arising at the interface of biology and engineering. By focusing especially on the material models that are deployed in diff erent laboratories, she demonstrates how these devices not only constitute an organ izing center for the laboratory's culture but also come to represent its signature. Here, actors' shaping of the laboratory cultures in each of the cases in question is made manifest by the central role played by a material device, collectively designed and transformed throughout the research pro cess.
Nersessian investigates the pro cesses by which these models both refl ect and help shape the laboratory's material, conceptual, and social practices. First, they allow people in the lab to connect their work to one another, serving as hubs through which the collective remains connected. Th ese devices are thus central to the mechanisms of interaction among participants. Second, the devices provide the means through which cognitive operations are carried out. Cognitive operations in the laboratory are hence intimately tied to the laboratory's culture, as indeed are the results they yield. Nersessian thereby introduces a new general phenomenon, echoed in other chapters as well: the knowledge produced in the context of a scientifi c culture pres ents specifi cities that can be correlated with features of the culture itself.
Th e aspects so far evoked could have been captured through looking at the laboratory cultures as epistemic cultures. However, a third key dimension is precisely what Keller's epistemological cultures bring into focus: these devices, Nersessian argues, come to embody the epistemological values and hypotheses of the lab. Indeed, the study shows that, far from being static, the devices and hence the cultures they help constitute are shaped and reshaped by the actors in the laboratory according both to past results and to the (evolving) dictates of par tic u lar experimental agendas. Also, illustrating MacKenzie's comments about the historicity of epistemological cultures, they embody the cognitive history of the lab-a history that is recorded by the actors both as a potential guide to future developments and as a conscious reminder of the evolution of the laboratory's culture. Th e correlation between the scientifi c culture, on the one hand, and the questions addressed and the goals pursued in the laboratory, on the other, is here not only established but also clarifi ed.
Th e cases Nersessian studies also illustrate how specifi c cultures are shaped as separate from other cultures in which similar prob lems are addressed. At the same time, these cases highlight the openness and ongoing interactivity of the cultures with re spect to their environments-in this context, specifically the other cultures with which they are in communication. Th e devices are thus hybrid-borrowing from biomedicine and engineering while at the same time feeding back into the cultures from which they derive; the values they embody are equally hybrid and dynamic, collectively shaped through the research pro cess.
In chapter 6 Mary S. Morgan focuses on the ways in which a scientifi c culture shapes an object of study while also fashioning new resources for research. With her case study of the emergence of an epistemic object out of a wider cultural transformation, she illustrates yet another form of openness of a local scientifi c culture. Her concern is with the "glass ceiling," a phenomenon that became an object of study for social scientists-indeed, that became vis i ble to the public at large-only in late twentieth-century Amer i ca, its visibility arising in direct response to the rise of second-wave feminism. Also, and of par tic u lar interest to us here, is the extent to which the scientifi c study of the glass ceiling made use of qualitative personal experience-a mode of analy sis that had previously been absent from conventional social science studies but that was now demanded by feminist critiques. Here too, the dynamic and open nature of the way of working and its shaping by researchers are manifest, in this case aff ecting the type of the data used as resources. Th e inclusion of these data may have been a response to external pressure, but it clearly led to a radical shift in the internal epistemological culture of those studying the glass ceiling.
Morgan draws from this historical example some penetrating observations about potential diff erences between scientifi c cultures in the social and natu ral sciences, arising not only from the intimate relation between the collectives of scientist-observers and the larger community in which they live but also from the relations among communities of observers, of observed, and of generators of questions and concerns. As her case study clearly illustrates, cultures of social-scientifi c practice are de facto both open to and dependent upon the environments in which they are embedded. Indeed, it is in good part the larger communities that "raise questions and prompt what is found problematic and thus what is studied. " Th ey also infl uence how it is to be studied. Th us, in addition to providing the context for scientifi c research, these wider communities may be far more involved in defi ning matters of content and ontology than they are in the study of the natu ral sciences.
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate the centrality of communication among vari ous types of contiguous collectives to a culture of scientifi c practice. We see actors borrowing ele ments that they then recycle to shape tools, topics of research, and even data. Forms of communication forged and adopted to connect laboratories and their environments thus emerge as essential features of the constitution and transformations of (at least some) scientifi c cultures, and it is precisely this topic that Claude Rosental addresses in chapter 7.
Rosental's case study deals with a very specifi c form of such communication, one that has become omnipresent in certain pres ent-day scientifi c and technological practices: the public demonstration (demo). Th e simple fact that forms of communication vary illustrates their historicity and, accordingly, the malleability of cultures that adopt and adapt to new modes of communicating. In this specifi c case, demos depend on new techniques of communication, and they emerged in parallel with new modes of funding and management. By concentrating on them, Rosental in fact also suggests the fruitfulness of a cultural approach to funding schemes and management.
Th e focal point of Rosental's analy sis is the use of demos in facilitating communication among man ag ers, policy makers, and the public, on the one hand, and scientifi c workers on the other, and the impact of this form of communication on the knowledge culture itself. In the fi elds studied by Rosental, the need to produce such demonstrations for man ag ers of largescale programs shaped the organ ization of scientists' work in rather specifi c ways (a feature brought into focus by Knorr Cetina's notion of epistemic cultures). Further, Rosental argues that such modes of communication have a recognizable impact on the content of the work produced (issues that Keller's notion of epistemological cultures asks us to think about). Fi nally, because demos can be addressed to and visualized by a wider audiencethat is, specifi c features and modalities of communication-this wider audience's reactions can also contribute to defi ning the goals that prac ti tion ers set themselves.
Such demos have become an essential part of the scientifi c practices that use them. By virtue of their role in mediating communication between two diff er ent cultures (i.e., between man ag ers of science programs and groups engaged in specifi c proj ects), the demos are inevitably shaped by the culture of the man ag ers to whom they are directed. With the example of modes of communication, Rosental demonstrates once again the dynamic character of cultural formation as bodies of knowledge and forms of practice evolving in response to interactions among diff er ent communities.
Th us far, all of the chapters in part II concentrate on specifi c scientifi c cultures, and through a close study of some of their constituent ele ments and forms of communication they underscore the dynamic and interactive nature of the constitution of these cultures. By focusing on yet another cultural ele ment, David Rabouin in chapter 8 also draws our attention to patterns of cross-fertilization between diff er ent cultural formations in the context of a single discipline. Especially noteworthy are the patterns of intercultural circulation prominent in his discussion of style in the context of mathe matics. In contrast to other notions of style, notably Hacking's "style of reasoning," Rabouin suggests that a style in mathe matics can best be characterized as a way of writing. In the sense that he elaborates, a way of writing is an essential component of the scientifi c culture to which a mathematician belongs. 9 For this notion of style, Rabouin draws inspiration from a paper written by the mathematician Claude Chevalley in 1935. In eff ect, Rabouin, as observer, adopts an actor's category in his analytic toolbox. Th e historical context in which Chevalley introduced the concept of style, Rabouin argues, might shed light on its usefulness for us today, at the same time as it indicates the variety of views actors formed about this concept at that time. Just shortly before Chevalley's paper, the notion of style had been invoked with another meaning by the German mathematician Ludwig Bieberbach to denigrate Jewish mathe matics and praise the German or Aryan style of doing mathe matics. Th e risks attached to these views were unfortunately realized quite dramatically, and historians like Needham never lost sight of them. Rabouin suggests that Chevalley's 1935 article, putting forth a diff er ent notion of style that emphasized circulation not just between France and Germany but among mathematicians of all origins, was nothing less than naive, and not unrelated to his historical context.
In any case, Rabouin highlights several in ter est ing features that a notion of style conceived along these lines possesses. First, it helps account for the disunities in a mathematical culture of actors who other wise share the same practices. In par tic u lar, Rabouin suggests that actors can share a way of writing but can diff er in their interpretations of this writing. In short, they need not have a completely uniform way of working for their culture to be fruitful and dynamic. Th is remark points to a general and crucial issue of intracultural variation that awaits systematic research. Second, in contrast to Hacking's style of reasoning, in which all of mathe matics falls under a single style (or, at best, under two styles), Rabouin's notion of style enables us to distinguish among mathematical collectives. It also seems to better describe how actors actually work. Par tic u lar styles, understood as ways of writing, are cultural ele ments that readily circulate among local cultures. How actors might specify them, in local contexts, and which changes styles undergo in the pro cess of circulation are likewise issues worth pondering. Perhaps more impor tant, we can infer from Rabouin's argument that styles are thus able both to connect local cultures and to mediate between local and more global features. We return below to this type of phenomenon.
Such circulation not only illustrates cultural interaction but also helps account for the stability that mathematical knowledge so oft en displays. Indeed, insofar as the phenomenon of the stabilization of mathematical knowledge resembles the pro cess toward, and establishment of, sameness with which Ito is concerned, it would be in ter est ing to see if the circulation of ways of writing physics might also prove of explanatory value.
Part III: Toward a More Global ApproachEle ments of a History of Culture Making Taken together, the chapters in part II demonstrate how actors shape constituent ele ments specifi c to the culture in which they work. Importantly for our purpose, the chapters highlight how the formation of these ele ments draws on both internal and external resources and, more generally, how they are shaped by their larger po liti cal and social contexts. Actors design their working tools in response, for instance, to the directions of research and goals chosen, or to requirements from outside cultural formations with which they need to comply. In short, the making of scientifi c cultures has a history, and this history is as meaningful as the history of concepts and theories. What is more, these histories are intimately related to one another. Indeed, if these cultural ele ments provide analytic tools for understanding how collectives work, they also have explanatory power with regard to the types of knowledge produced in these contexts. We learn that knowledge and culture are dynamically correlated, with ele ments of both constantly circulating, taken up, and reworked by actors through the same type of pro cesses.
Similar conclusions arise from the more global approaches to scientifi c cultures presented in part III. Th ese studies illustrate the variation (according to the cases and issues dealt with) in scale at which analy sis must be conducted. Albeit from quite diff er ent perspectives, the fi rst two chapters focus on the resources individual actors bring into play in their shaping of their culture.
Koen Vermeir in chapter 9 explores the immediate context in which the term "culture" (as an actor's category, borrowed from agriculture) was fi rst systematically employed to refer to the cultivation of a group of humans, in discussions of educational reform in Jesuit institutions in early modern Eu rope. Th ese early uses of the term "culture" bring to the fore an issue of general importance to our concerns: the specifi c type of activity required for cultivating oneself or one's talent-in other words, what MacKenzie calls the pro cess of socialization required to reach the state of culture valued in a par tic u lar social context. Vermeir's study also sheds light on how the actors themselves contribute to designing the pro cess of acculturation.
Vermeir identifi es the successive editions of Antonio Possevino's Cultura Ingeniorum (starting in 1593) as the main sites attesting to the shaping of this Jesuit epistemic culture. Th rough his analy sis, he is able to show the relevance of both goals (e.g., Possevino's po liti cal goals, dictated by the agenda of the Jesuit com pany) and social context (notably, that of the Counterreformation) in the shaping of that culture. As is oft en the case with actors' categories of culture, the craft ing of an identity that could be opposed to others was at the core of the proj ect. But, for Possevino, culture was an activity through which this identity could be achieved, in contrast to other actors' conceptions of culture as a state deriving either from nature or from belonging to a group. Symptomatically, to defi ne this new epistemic culture, Vermeir shows Possevino nevertheless borrowing ele ments from vari ous sources, selecting and remolding them for his own uses-indeed, much as Georges Cuvier later did in shaping a new scientifi c culture in paleontology, as Bruno Belhoste describes in chapter 10.
For Possevino, the emphasis was placed on the making of cultivated men, able to fulfi ll tasks useful for the Jesuit com pany. For Cuvier, by contrast, the point was to create an environment, modes of reasoning, and practices that would enable him to draw conclusions about new epistemic objects. To approach the constitution of this culture, Belhoste fi rst focuses on the working spaces developed by Cuvier at the end of the eigh teenth century and beginning of nineteenth century in his eff ort to identify and restore extinct species. However, the task Belhoste sets himself leads him to suggest extending the meaning of the notion of working space, to designate less a physical location than a dispositif, the system of social, material, and epistemological resources that Cuvier assembled and mobilized (all of which could be found in the urban setting of Paris) to pursue his goals.
Cuvier's achievements depended on the par tic u lar way of carry ing out research in paleontology that he forged out of this dispositif. He drew crucially from three distinct cultures, from which he created a unique synthesis: the traditions of museum culture, with the knowledge machineries and epistemological values attached to them; the culture of late Newtonianism then dominating the physical sciences in France, and especially the value it placed on specifi c styles of reasoning and types of explanation; and, fi nally, the epistemological resources of con temporary historical and antiquarian scholarship. Cuvier also put into play the many social and administrative resources provided and/or facilitated by his position at the National Museum of Natu ral History, as well as, of course, the wealth of analytic, observational, and graphical skills he personally had honed from years of experience. Belhoste's study shows us how Cuvier was able to fashion from these disparate resources a new and phenomenally productive way of carry ing out research in paleontology, even while recycling features from other cultural formations. Cuvier's example (like Possevino's) illustrates the ability of a single individual, while clearly drawing from the social, institutional, and professional world around him, to forge a practice that could evolve from one man's way of doing science into a disciplinary culture. In fact, the forging of this culture represents one of the most impor tant outcomes of Cuvier's work.
So far, we have mainly focused on the local shaping of a culture at a time, examining how this pro cess involved taking up ele ments from other cultures. However, such a perspective, attentive to a single culture, or at most the cultures from which the latter drew, does not allow us to consider what happens through borrowing and reshaping at higher levels. Th e question that pres ents itself now is, does every culture of scientifi c practice follow a specifi c path, or are there phenomena that connect and relate these pro cesses with one another? In brief, what does a more global perspective reveal about how these local cultures exchange with one another? Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in chapter 11 off ers a crucial contribution to precisely these questions.
In his own eff ort to account for the generation of meaning in the context of scientifi c activity, Rheinberger fi nds it necessary to shift focus to what he calls a meso-level of analy sis, intermediate between the micro-level of most laboratory studies and macro-level histories of disciplines. To this end, he invokes the concept of cultures of experiment-networks of experimental systems that are not only held together by material forms of sharing (i.e., by the sharing of technologies, of human agents with scientifi c know-how, and of biological substrates, objects, and/or experimental environments) but that actually unfold from these material interactions (see Rheinberger 1997, esp. chap. 9, for a development of these ideas).
Sharing, a form of communication that establishes bridges between a local culture and other cultural formations, appears here as a crucial operation, which incidentally evokes Rabouin's suggestion with re spect to how styles as ways of writing work in mathe matics. However, it would be a mistake to take sharing as a transparent operation. What is shared across a network, how it is shared, and what the eff ects of sharing are-these are crucial issues that remain in need of further analy sis. Indeed, they are the ele ments by which another form of culture is shaped. What Rheinberger in fact suggests is that here, too, it is part of actors' activity to develop and shape these modes of sharing (indeed, in shaping the entire meso-level of cultural formation), and it behooves us to attend to the work thereby involved.
Rheinberger's par tic u lar case study focuses on the culture of in vivo experimentation, and he traces the historical evolution of this culture through the interactions between experimental systems developed in physiology and biochemistry. Despite operating on a diff er ent scale, experimental systems play much the same role for Rheinberger in the generation of scientifi c cultures as do Nancy Nersessian's devices: both serve si mul ta neously in the formation of a scientifi c community and as generators and embodiments of its current state of knowledge. In a sense, this view off ers a suggestion with re spect to both how phenomena like Kuhn's paradigms can take shape, and how the collective in the context of which they are adopted is dynamically formed.
Fi nally, as to the larger question of what, if anything, is special about scientifi c/experimental cultures, Rheinberger calls our attention to the inadequacies of the conventional opposition between culture and naturean opposition that typically echoes the equally canonical division between mind and matter. In opposition to such dichotomies, Rheinberger insists on grounding culture itself in material interactions, while at the same time emphasizing that these interactions constitute the nodes through which meaning/culture is collectively engendered. In so doing, he points to the partic u lar modes of circulation between mind and matter, nature and culture, as a way of addressing the question of what is special about experimental cultures. Rheinberger's approach thus further contributes to elucidating the dynamic and collective construction of sameness.
Th rough the clear-cut contrast it pres ents with Rheinberger's work in chapter 11, Fa-Ti Fan's study of an experimental culture in chapter 12 highlights the role actors play in shaping such cultures. It shows diff er ent modes of data shaping and data sharing, other types of actors involved, other pro cesses of socialization, and other kinds of networks and forms of communication. Fi nally, it also brings into focus the impact of other cultural formations in the pro cess of shaping these cultures.
By comparison with Rheinberger's case study, where the scale was smaller than that of a discipline, Fan's analy sis of earthquake prediction as practiced in communist China during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s requires more of a macro perspective. It deals not with an academic culture but with a " people's science" of earthquake monitoring. Th e broader po liti cal and cultural context in which this scientifi c culture took shape can scarcely be ignored. Fan's main point is to stress the interaction of scientifi c ideas and po liti cal beliefs in shaping earthquake monitoring practices. From this politi cal environment developed a culture of seismological practice with an agenda of its own. In par tic u lar, Fan emphasizes the variety of means (publication, training, material devices, and even a rhe toric of cultural essentialism) deployed to facilitate the inclusion of all citizens. Th is new knowledge culture further employed specifi c knowledge machinery: par tic u lar instruments, modes of observation, criteria for the mobilization of personnel and for the collection of data, and modes of communication. Each of these features refl ected a value more generally placed on mass participation in the production and consumption of scientifi c knowledge, and together they account for the marked diff erences between the culture of seismology that developed in the China of that time and other, more exclusively academic cultures.
Fan's culture of earthquake prediction is further distinguished by methodological assumptions (e.g., an emphasis on the role of macroscopic phenomena in short-term prediction, the relatively greater signifi cance attached to correlations over mathematical modeling, and the importance of a phenomenological approach) that embody prized epistemological values (e.g., precision). Noteworthy for us is the fact that all these cultural features can be correlated with the type of knowledge produced in this context.
Fan's study thus echoes some of the points made by Morgan in her chapter concerning the infl uence of the wider community on both the knowledge produced and the practices developed by a par tic u lar scientifi c culture. In like manner, Fan's observations of Mao extolling "Chinese science" as a complement to Western science echo Lachenal's and Ito's concerns about the opportunistic uses of self-orientalism. Like these other contributors, Fan too warns against the uncritical adoption of this actors' category in the observers' analytic toolbox.
With this chapter, we conclude our exploration of the approach to culture that is at the core of this book. We began with the theses that cultures are an outcome of actors' knowledge activity, in parallel and, more impor tant, in correlation with other outcomes such as concepts, results, and theories. Exploring these theses led us to notice other equally impor tant phenomena (e.g., the ways in which cultures of scientifi c practice borrow both from one another and from other cultural formations). Moreover, we can observe the work that actors perform in establishing the networks of sharing that shape higher-level cultures.
Part IV: Historiographic Implications Yet a fi nal question still remains: what might be the historiographic implications of identifying multiple coexisting scientifi c cultures? Th is is the question that part IV addresses, fi rst from a synchronic and then from a diachronic viewpoint. Both of the case studies in part IV are devoted to mathe matics, a discipline for which the historiographic implications of the notions of scientifi c culture, or of a multiplicity of cultures, have only recently begun to be systematically examined. Furthermore, previous discussions of such issues have either taken "culture" in the singular, or have taken an approach cast in conventional culturalist terms. We aim for a discussion more faithful to the actual practices of mathe matics.
Caroline Ehrhardt takes a synchronic perspective in chapter 13, illustrating what can be gained by considering the distinct professional mathematical cultures of nineteenth-century Eu rope. She makes the strategic choice of concentrating on a single work, one that was widely read at the time: Galois's memoir about the resolution of equations. To shed light on the multiplicity of mathematical cultures, she focuses on the variety of ways in which Galois's ideas, as outlined in this memoir, were appropriated and developed by differ ent groups of mathematicians working in diff er ent contexts. Her key point is to suggest that the notion of local culture helps us account for the vari ous readings that were made of Galois's writings and the vari ous mathematical theories that were built on the basis of these readings. Of par tic u lar relevance in this case is the fact that these local cultures diff er in their practices of both proof and defi nition, in their ways of writing, in the mathematical contexts in which they interpret and develop Galois's writings, in their goals, and in their epistemological choices. At the same time, however, suffi cient commonality needed to underlie all of these local cultures-this points to the existence of the meso-level introduced by Rheinberger-for Galois's writings to be meaningful to all of them in spite of their diff erences. What Ehrhardt shows is that these separate developments were later reworked and integrated into what came to be considered a unifi ed Galois theory (despite in ter est ing variations from one context to another). She thereby highlights the mathematical fruitfulness of having diff er ent mathematical cultures reworking, each in its own way, the same ideas. More generally, at several points, Ehrhardt also emphasizes how mathematicians regularly combine results and practices developed in diff er ent mathematical cultures. In this re spect, textbooks appear as a specifi cally impor tant site for the construction and circulation of such hybrid theories-in Rheinberger's terms, one of the sites for the fashioning of a knowledge that can be shared at a meso-level.
Recognizing the coexistence of diff er ent mathematical cultures thus enables the historian to account for the vari ous ways in which a single work can come to be appropriated and enriched. In addition, it sheds light on the prob lem of the highly nonlinear pro cesses by means of which knowledge comes to appear universal. At the same time, like Rabouin, Ehrhardt stresses the limits of uniformity, showing that, even within a given mathematical culture, mathematicians can and do follow their own individual trajectories.
Karine Chemla in chapter 14 also focuses on the historiographic implications of identifying distinct mathematical cultures but from a diachronic perspective. Also, because it deals with long-term history, and more specifically with ancient history, her chapter raises a new set of issues. Sociologists and anthropologists have rightly emphasized fi eldwork as providing privileged access to the description of cultures of scientifi c practice. However, were this the only access, historians of science would be seriously limited in their inquiry. Several chapters in the book have argued that sources from the past also shed light on the character of scientifi c cultures. Ancient history, with the scarcity of documents that usually haunts it, represents a par tic u lar challenge.
Th e fi rst issue Chemla addresses in her description of mathematical cultures of the past is precisely one of method. Sources that were written in relation to specifi c cultures of mathematical practice, she argues, oft en contain clues that historians can use to describe these cultures. Employing a set of Chinese mathematical sources selected from writings composed between the fi rst and the thirteenth centuries, she demonstrates the existence of distinct mathematical cultures in ancient China, appearing at diff er ent times and displaying both considerable overlap with and signifi cant diff erences from one other.
She argues that the main historiographic benefi t provided by an interest in ancient cultures is that the identifi cation and description of such cultures give us crucial information for interpreting the available sources. She illustrates this claim with the example of quadratic equations, demonstrating how characterizing the cultures to which the vari ous Chinese sources bear witness enables the historian not only to identify distinct kinds of knowledge about these equations, attested to by these sources, but also to capture in a new way the continuities and diff erences among them. In brief, conceptual history requires a history of culture making.
Chemla's main thesis-the second historiographic implication she points to-is that the description of cultures thereby yields impor tant tools to carry out conceptual history and brings out new phenomena. Indeed, she argues that the development of new concepts of quadratic equations to which her corpus attests can be directly correlated with aspects of the mathematical culture in which they take shape. However, there is no determinism in this correlation. Rather, Chemla suggests, it indicates "that cultures also change partly in relation to the conceptual work done . . . as much as the concepts change in relation to how actors worked. " Especially noteworthy for the general proj ect of the book are the interconnections and correlations between these cultural and conceptual changes, similar to those Nersessian identifi ed in her anthropological study of laboratories. Th e history of concepts thus appears as deeply intertwined with the history of culture making.
Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research
We began this introduction by inquiring about the relation between and among the vari ous concepts that have been recently introduced to characterize the specifi city of diff er ent ways of making scientifi c knowledge. Th e essays in this book suggest a clear answer to that question: diff erences in cultures of scientifi c practice are multidimensional. Far from off ering alternative descriptions/conceptions of diff erences among ways of practicing science, each of the vari ous labels (e.g., styles of thought, styles of reasoning, epistemic cultures, or epistemological cultures) captures certain dimensions of these diff erences. One can argue over the suitability of these labels for par tic u lar contexts and suggest alternatives (as, e.g., Rabouin does in response to Hacking), but it is useful to recognize that which dimensions are focused on likely refl ect the par tic u lar aims of the author.
What ever the case may be, it thus appears that these labels are complementary. Th is is why we have mainly spoken of "culture" in this introduction, emphasizing the features brought into focus by this or that more specifi c concept. Interestingly enough, these labels each refl ect the disciplinary culture of their author and the kinds of source material on which he or she has been working. It is, for instance, not by chance that it was through an ethnographical study devoted to, on the one hand, pres ent-day high-energy physics and, on the other, molecular biology that sociologist Knorr Cetina was struck by the relevance of vari ous types of machineries of knowing in the production of knowledge. Such a dimension would not have appeared so prominently through a research work devoted to ancient Greek mathe matics and yet might nonetheless prove fruitful for it. Similarly, it is not by chance that Keller's historical work on diff er ent disciplinary approaches to the study of embryonic development drew her attention to the philosophical and even logical dimensions of scientifi c culture.
Th e variety of case studies explored from diff er ent disciplinary perspectives and that make use of diff er ent kinds of sources thus appears to be a clear asset. Not surprisingly, the essays in this book, written by scholars with differ ent backgrounds working on diff er ent time periods, diff er ent disciplines, and diff er ent regions of the planet, not only show how diff er ent concepts of cultural diff erence can inform and enrich concrete studies but also invite us to consider other dimensions that might be relevant in characterizing scientifi c cultures. In science studies, too, the diversity of scientifi c cultures is an asset, provided that we strive to achieve the meso-level, where our diff erent practices and bodies of conceptual knowledge can be at least partially integrated.
Another question we raised in the beginning of this introduction is, how can one write about scientifi c cultures as recognizable and consequential categories, without inviting the assumption that they are fi xed and closed to external infl uence? And here, too, we suggest the essays conjointly support and inform the theses we have put forward. Th e concept of culture that emerges from these studies is something fl uid, dynamic, and porous, all properties that result from the fact that, as we have repeatedly stressed, scientifi c cultures are de facto
• forged by actors in relation to the questions they address, the goals they set themselves, and the resources they have available and recycle; • in constant interaction with both other cultures and the external environment; and, for that very reason, • open rather than closed.
Th ese remarks thus call for the development of a history of culture making, in parallel with the histories that attend to concepts or theories.
One impor tant consequence emerges from the features listed above, and it is duly noted and examined in some of the essays. Th e bodies of knowledge produced in these cultures pres ent correlations with features of the cultures in which they took shape. However, more than determinism, what we see is a phenomenon of coconstruction, whereby each of the two terms, knowledge and culture, is shaped in intimate relation to the other. Moreover, the ele-Introduction · 23 ments of knowledge thus produced are de facto taken as resources in other cultural contexts. Th is phenomenon reveals another dimension of actors' activity: establishing bridges between cultures. One facet of the phenomenon is the establishment of meso-level entities introduced by Rhein berger. Another facet is the creation of syntheses of the kind studied by Ehrhardt. Th ese are some of the pro cesses through which the making of sameness is carried out.
Fi nally, just a few words about the prob lem of relativism with re spect to the sciences. In our view, this prob lem is sorely in need of clarifi cation. Indeed, the prob lem is closely related to issues, addressed by several of the contributors here, concerning the stabilization, unifi cation, and even universalization of scientifi c knowledge, all of which require further investigation. But even on the basis of these brief forays, it seems evident that the emergence of the very question of relativism depends, at least to some extent, on notions of culture as fi xed, closed, and impervious to outside infl uence. If, by contrast, we recognize the fostering of interaction among cultures of scientifi c practice (both with one another and with the worlds around them) as a key dimension of actors' work, we can begin to recognize the construction of consensus as an ongoing process-one that persists in the face of diff erences of interpretation, interests, and the purposes for which knowledge is sought. Consensus, sameness, and universality may be ideals to work toward, but they can never be fully realized. And fortunately so, for variation is essential for the fertilization of new cultures.
Notes

